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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA : Case No. 940684-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief 
or in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(g) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-28-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-7 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
If a court indefinitely suspends sentencing proceedings of a 
defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction and the State does 
nothing to secure the defendant's return to Utah, since the Utah 
sentence may never be imposed does the Utah court subsequently 
lose jurisdiction over the matter? See (R 170-86; 247-93; 295-
327) (motion and arguments to vacate sentence based on lack of 
jurisdiction). Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989) ("A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded 
no particular deference"); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 
(Utah 1991) ("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the 
law"); cf. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991) 
("Because the issue goes to jurisdiction, this court can raise 
the issue sua sponte and at any time"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant/ 
appellant's motion to vacate his sentence, a ruling dated October 
21, 1995, and rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. 
(R 203, 206-10). 
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted Mr. Rogelio Limonta Leyva 
of three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) . (R 55, 79, 103-05). On August 28, 
1989, (R 74), the date originally set for sentencing, the court 
ordered Mr. Leyva to "be released to beehive bond" and 
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rescheduled the proceeding for a later date. (R 110). 
Sentencing was rescheduled on three different instances and then 
addressed by the court on January 16, 1990.x (R 111-14; 116-17; 
122-23) . 
On January 16, 1990, " It]he sentencing [was! continued 
without date11 after the court had been advised "that the 
defendant is incarcerated in San Bernadino, CA.'" (R 125) 
(emphasis added). The court issued a bench warrant for 
Mr. Leyva's return although it was directed only at Utah law 
enforcement officers. (R 125-26). 
Following his period of confinement in San Bernadino on 
California charges, immigration authorities (INS) held Mr. Leyva 
without filing federal charges while they considered deportation 
proceedings. (R 239). Even though Mr. Leyva was not deported, 
he was held and transported repeatedly to numerous 
penitentiaries. (R 238-40; 272-72) (Rogelio was imprisoned in 
Chino, California; Shakawala, Arizona; Susanville, California; 
Donovan, California; Chula Vista, California; El Centro, 
1
 On September 25, 1989, at 4:30 p.m., after Mr. Leyva had 
appeared in court with counsel, the sentencing proceeding was 
continued until November 13, 1989. (R 114). On "motion of the 
defense, the court [again] continue[d] the sentencing for 
[Rogelio Limonta] from 11/13/89 to 11/27/89 @ 9 A.M." (R 117); 
see also (R 112-14; 116-17) (a presentence report had not been 
prepared by AP&P on either occasion because Mr. Leyva reportedly 
missed the scheduled appointments). On November 27, 1989, 
defense counsel telephoned the court to inform it counsel had 
been trapped by a snowstorm and was unable to attend the 
sentencing. (R 255). The matter was continued until December 
11, 1989. (R 122). Finally, due to the unexpected 
hospitalization of defense counsel, the case was continued until 
January 16, 1990. (R 123, 255). 
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California; Limestone County, Texas; Terra Haute, Indiana; 
Tucson, Arizona; and Inglewood, Colorado.). 
On March 4, 1994, after being incarcerated for over four 
years in state and federal institutions, Rogelio Leyva was 
returned to Utah for sentencing on his 1989 charges. Defense 
counsel did not challenge the court's jurisdiction or the 
unreasonable delay in sentencing. (R 233-45). Rather, defense 
counsel, together with the State and Adult Parole and Probation, 
recommended a sentence of probation in recognition of the 
incarceration already served by Mr. Leyva. (R 236-3 7) . 
The court here imposed a sentence of one-to-fifteen years in 
prison for each of his three 1989 convictions. The three terms 
ran concurrently, with a fine imposed of $10,000. (R 242). The 
court immediately suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Leyva on 
probation for 36 months. (R 242). 
During an Order to Show Cause proceeding, dated August 12, 
1994, AP&P alleged that Mr. Leyva had violated his probation. 
(R 141-44). Mr. Leyva denied the allegations. During the same 
proceeding, Loni Deland withdrew as counsel for Mr. Leyva and the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to continue 
representation. (R 157). 
Newly appointed counsel then challenged the revocation 
proceeding on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the underlying 
sentence of probation had been illegally imposed. See (R 170-86; 
247-93; 295-327) (motion and arguments to vacate sentence). The 
court, however, denied his motion and this appeal followed. 
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(R 206-10; 320-27). Procedural facts other those summarized 
above are addressed in the court's ruling or in the "Argument" 
section of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The court's order denying Mr. Leyva's motion to vacate 
sentence included the following "Findings of Fact" and 
"Conclusions of Law": 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 27, 19 [892] , defendant was convicted 
of three counts of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance. Each was a second degree felony. 
2. Following the verdict, this Court set a 
sentencing date. That date was continued several times 
either at the request of defendant's trial counsel, 
Loni Deland, or because defendant did not appear at the 
date set. Eventually, the sentencing date was set for 
January 16, 1990. 
3. Sometime after the jury verdict defendant 
voluntarily left Utah and went to California. While 
there, defendant was arrested on other charges and 
incarcerated. 
4. On January 16, 1990, the defendant did not 
appear. This Court was informed that defendant did not 
appear because he was incarcerated on other charges in 
California. This Court continued sentencing without 
date pending defendant's return. 
5. The State initially did not file a detainer 
with California correction authorities. 
6. Defendant filed a 180 day disposition notice. 
No action was taken on the 180 day notice because the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office determined the Utah 
Code Annotated Sec. 77-29-1 did not apply to cases that 
had already been tried and were only awaiting 
sentencing. 
2
 The court mistakenly listed a date of July 27, 1990, 
which appears to be a typographical error. The correct date 
should be July 27, 1989. See (R 55, 79, 103-05). 
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7. Although Loni Deland, was still defendant's 
attorney throughout the period that defendant was 
incarcerated out of state, defendant did not ask Deland 
to file, and Deland did not file, any motions 
challenging the delay in his sentencing. 
8. After defendant served his time in California, 
the United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) obtained custody and held defendant 
because of problems with his status in the United 
States. Because there was no treaty which allowed his 
deportation back to Cuba defendant was eventually 
transferred to Colorado. Early in 1994, INS released 
defendant and he was promptly returned to Utah to be 
sentenced. 
9. On March 4, 1994, defendant was present 
before this Court and was sentenced. At the 
sentencing, defendant did not make any objection to 
this Court about the delay in his sentencing or this 
Court's jurisdiction to sentence. 
10. Defendant has not shown any specific 
prejudice that resulted from the delay in his sentence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant was absent from his sentencing in 
January 1990 because he was incarcerated in California. 
However, Defendant voluntarily left Utah pending his 
sentencing. He voluntarily traveled to California. He 
committed new criminal acts in California. His arrest 
and incarceration in California were a consequence of 
his voluntary acts. Therefore, Defendant's failure to 
appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary. 
2. This Court is not convinced that a criminal 
defendant has the right to a speedy sentencing. 
However, if such a right exists the four factors 
articulated for considering a violation for the right 
to speedy trial apply. These factors are, the length 
of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the 
defendant. However, defendant has failed to make a 
sufficient showing that these factors warrant a finding 
of denial of any right defendant may have to a speedy 
sentencing. Although the delay between the verdict and 
the sentence was considerable, it was caused by 
defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else 
his counsel's request for continuances and then by 
defendant leaving Utah and committing other criminal 
offenses in California. Defendant did not assert any 
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right to a speedy sentencing. Defendant was not 
prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing. 
3. Defendant's request for disposition of untried 
case within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not 
an assertion of defendant's right to speedy sentencing. 
4. The case of In Re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 
532 (Utah 1903) is distinguishable from the facts in 
this case and is not controlling. 
5. Defendant cannot divest this Court of 
jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily absenting 
himself from the jurisdiction of this Court prior to 
imposition of sentence. 
(R 206-10) (emphasis added) (attached as Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Jurisdiction was lost in the case at bar when the trial 
court "continued without date" sentencing proceedings which were 
needed to finalize Mr. Leyva's case. The State was aware that 
Rogelio Leyva was imprisoned in another jurisdiction, but it did 
nothing to ensure Mr. Leyva7s return to Utah. The State did not 
attempt to extradite him, nor did it file an appropriate 
detainer. Moreover, despite Mr. Leyva's request to have his case 
disposed of, the State expressly refused to take action. The 
indefinite and open-ended nature of the court's order, together 
with the State's inaction in a matter which extended over four 
years, left in "limbo" Mr. Leyva's sentencing proceeding. The 
court should have vacated the sentence which was finally imposed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER MR. LEYVA BECAUSE 
OF ITS ORDER INDEFINITELY SUSPENDING SENTENCE AND 
THE STATE'S INACTION IN THE MATTER 
Contrary to the position held by the trial court, the long-
standing principles of In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903), govern the case at bar: 
there are many exigencies that could arise which might, 
in the interests of justice, require a postponement of 
the time for sentence beyond that first fixed by the 
court. In such cases the court may, in order to protect 
the interests of the state, and give the defendant ample 
time and opportunity to avail himself of every safeguard 
guaranteed him by law, suspend sentence from one 
designated time to another. But we know of no rule or 
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely 
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of 
suspense and uncertainty, and, long after he has been 
discharged from custody, have him rearrested, and impose 
a sentence of either fine or imprisonment of him. A 
suspension of sentence for an indefinite period is, in 
effect, an exercise of the functions of the pardoning 
power, which belongs exclusively to the board of 
pardons, --a separate and distinct department of the 
state government, and in no way connected with the trial 
courts. 
Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added and citations omitted).3 
On January 16, 1990, the trial court indefinitely suspended 
Mr. Leyva's sentence by ruling, "The sentencing is continued 
without date." (R 125) (emphasis added) (attached as 
Addendum C). Although at the time Mr. Leyva was incarcerated in 
California on other charges, (R 125, 207), the Utah sentence 
still should not have been continued indefinitely. 
3
 The statutes in Flint mirror existing authority albeit 
some minor revisions have since been made. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201. 
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His three Utah convictions, all dated July 27, 1989, (R 103-
05), required the accompanying imposition of sentence regardless 
of his status in another jurisdiction. Cf. State v. Green, 757 
P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988) (a defendant faced with a sentence must 
not "be left in a perpetual state of limbo . . . [or] subject to 
a continued term of fictional supervision"). To continue 
sentencing without a fixed date creates "absurd results". Id. 
The present case illustrates why an indefinite sentencing date is 
improper. 
Where, as here, the court fails to impose sentence during 
the trial proceedings, the defendant is deprived of his 
constitutional right to an appeal. (R 317); Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(g). A judgment in a criminal 
matter that fails to impose sentence does not resolve the 
proceedings between the parties, and "[i]t is the sentence itself 
which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the 
right to appeal." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1978); see also State in Interest of T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201, 202 
(Utah App. 1988) (A final judgment is one that ends the 
proceedings between the parties, "leaving no question open for 
further judicial action"). Although an appeal could have been 
filed after Mr. Leyva was sentenced, since the sentence itself 
was suspended indefinitely the accompanying right to an appeal 
was similarly sacrificed. 
Hence, the court's order of January 16, 1990, (R 125), which 
was continued without date not only left Mr. Leyva in "limbo" for 
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purposes of sentencing, the indefinite order left Rogelio 
powerless to challenge the conviction itself. (R 317); cf. State 
v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) (a prisoner who escapes from 
custody does not forfeit his right to appeal because the escape 
may be punished through other means). 
"Absurd results" are further reflected by what almost 
happened under the court's indefinite sentencing order. Although 
immigration authorities ("INS") never filed charges against 
Mr. Leyva, the INS still imprisoned Rogelio and retained custody 
and control over him even after he had served his time in San 
Bernadino, California. (R 209; 238-40; 272-78) (Rogelio was also 
imprisoned in Chino, California; Shakawala, Arizona; Susanville, 
California; Donovan, California; Chula Vista, California; El 
Centro, California; Limestone County, Texas; Terra Haute, 
Indiana; Tucson, Arizona; and Inglewood, Colorado.). 
Moreover, because of the open-ended nature of the court's 
order, (R 125), sentencing in Utah for the 1989 convictions would 
have been "continued" forever if the INS had simply decided to 
deport Rogelio or if his federal imprisonment had ended with INS 
"releas[ing] him to the streets without any form of conditions of 
probation." (R 239-40) (the federal government considered such 
an unconditional release as well as deportation proceedings). 
Even if an indefinite suspension had not occurred, the 
court's order allowed many years or even decades to pass before a 
sentence could be imposed for the July 27, 1989, convictions (and 
his concomitant right to appeal). Having done little to secure 
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Mr. Leyva after his time in California, sentencing proceedings in 
Utah would be triggered only by the off-chance that law 
enforcement agencies became aware of Mr. Leyva's return to 
Utah.4 
According to the court below, when Rogelio was in 
California, "The State initially did not file a detainer with 
California correction authorities." (R 207) {Finding of Fact 
No. 5). The State claimed that "detainers on sentencings are not 
appropriate . . . ," (R 264), but case law suggests otherwise. 
For example, in Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), the 
state of Utah filed a detainer on three separate occasions and in 
two of the instances, the detainers involved sentencing 
proceedings. 
Appellant Hearn was serving a sentence in Washington State 
Penitentiary when the state of Utah filed a detainer there to 
bring him back to "face charges of armed robbery in this state." 
Id. at 758. Following Hearn7s trial and conviction in Utah, he 
was imprisoned briefly here before Utah realized that they had to 
return him to Washington. 
Now cognizant "of their obligations under the Agreement [the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers], Utah returned appellant to 
4
 The effect of the court's bench warrant here is similar to 
the ineffectiveness of the bench warrant issued in State v. Moya, 
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991). In Moya, the defendant "argue[d] 
that the court lost jurisdiction when it effectively suspended his 
incarceration indefinitely by withdrawing the nationwide arrest 
warrant and substituting a domestic warrant. Defendant [Moya] 
claim [ed] he was free from incarceration as long as he remained 
outside Utah, or while in Utah, avoided arrest." 815 P.2d at 1315 
n.4. The issue there, however, was not decided. Id. 
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Washington State, subiect to a detainer to return him to complete 
his Utah sentence after he had completed his sentence there." 
Id. at 758 (emphasis added). Thereafter, while Hearn still was 
imprisoned, he was convicted in federal court and moved to a 
federal prison. Having apparently been overlooked during the 
federal transfer, Utah again filed another detainer with the 
federal institution to ensure that Hearn would finish his Utah 
sentence. 
In short, detainers on sentencings are appropriate. The 
failure of the prosecution in the case at bar to file or send one 
is an omission critical to distinguishing other cases where a 
detainer was in fact filed. See, e.g., Crosland v. State, 857 
P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340, 1341 
(Utah 1974). The prosecution here omitted or neglected this key-
step despite authority allowing it to do so. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-28-2; 77-28a-2; 77-29-7. 
Since the Board of Pardons and Parole has no jurisdiction 
over matters which have not been sentenced, the onus is on the 
prosecution to ensure his return to Utah. Cf. Ontiveros v. Utah 
Bd of Pardons, Case No. 940290-CA (Utah App. June 15, 1995) ("the 
Utah Board of Pardons issued a warrant of detainer to California" 
to ensure appellant Ontiveros' return to and completion of his 
Utah sentence after serving time in a California prison); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-7 ("All courts, departments, agencies, officers 
and employees of this state and its political subdivisions are 
hereby directed to enforce the agreement on detainers and to 
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cooperate with one another and with other party states in 
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose"). Utah 
authorities, however, did nothing to provide for Rogelio Leyva's 
return during his January 16, 1990, sentencing proceeding, and 
the prosecution expressly refused to honor Mr. Leyva's 
subsequently filed 180 day disposition notice. (R 207-08; 264). 
The court acknowledged that while Rogelio had filed a 180 
day disposition notice on or about May or June of 1991, (R 207; 
251-52, 273), "[n]o action was taken on the 180 day notice 
because the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office determined that 
the Utah Code Annotated Sec. 77-29-1 did not apply to cases that 
had already been tried and were only awaiting sentencing." 
(R 208) (Finding of Fact No. 6); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
(the statute does refer to "untried" matters,5 but regardless of 
its applicability, the State effectively waived further 
proceedings by failing to file a detainer pursuant to the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainer, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5). 
The State determination that section 77-29-1 did not apply 
5
 The provision relating to the 180 day disposition, section 
77-29-1, states in pertinent part: 
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in 
the state prison . . . of this state, and there is pending 
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver . . . a 
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the 
court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). 
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is actually of little import here. The more critical step was 
for the State to have first filed a detainer: 
[The Interstate Agreement on Detainers] enumerat[es] 
certain procedures through which prisoners can demand 
disposition of pending charges in another jurisdiction 
and by allowing member states to obtain prisoners being 
held by other member states. These procedures begin 
only after "a 'detainer' is filed with the custodial 
(sending) State by another State (receiving) having 
untried charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain 
temporary custody, the receiving State must also file an 
appropriate 'request' with the sending State. Custodial 
officials must then notify the prisoner of the detainer. 
Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added 
and citations omitted). 
With the applicability of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers seemingly linked to "any untried indictment, 
information or complaint", see Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (Article 
III, paragraph (a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1), authority 
defining the full extent and meaning of being "tried" lends 
appropriate guidance. 
"'[T]he sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment,' by implication including the whole trial 
process within the ambit of the speedy trial right." State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986) (quoting Pollard v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957)). "[W]e conclude that the right 
to a speedy trial may encompass the time during which a matter is 
under consideration. A speedy trial necessarily contemplates not 
only a seasonal trial of the facts, but also a seasonal decision 
and sentencing following trial." Banks, 720 P.2d at 1385. 
Mr. Leyva's case may have been partially tried upon the 
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rendering of the jury's verdict, (R 103-05), but absent the 
sentencing proceedings his case remained easonally untried. 
(R 125). A proceeding without the imposition of sentence would 
constitute an unfinished or incomplete "trial". 
If the prosecution is unwilling to secure Mr. Leyva's 
requested return to Utah for sentencing and such proceedings are 
continued without date, the court's jurisdiction must end. 
Indefinite suspensions of sentence are precisely what In re Flint 
sought to avoid. 
Similarly, the court must retain control over the case until 
the entire matter is disposed of. 
After conviction the trial court may undoubtedly suspend 
judgment temporarily for stated periods, from time to 
time. It may be proper to do so to allow the defendant 
time to move for a new trial, to perfect an appeal, to 
present a petition for pardon, and to allow the court 
time to consider and determine the sentence to be 
imposed. But when a defendant stands convicted, and all 
the remedies provided by law for testing the correctness 
of the conviction have been exhausted or waived,[6] we 
have no doubt it is the duty of the court to keep 
control of the case, and within a reasonable time to 
proceed to give judgment, and, in doing so, to exercise 
such discretion as the statute governing the particular 
offense commits to the courts. 
In re Flint, 71 P. at 532 (footnote and emphasis added). 
The court and the prosecution here both relinquished control 
over Rogelio Leyva's case for sentencing purposes. The state of 
Utah's jurisdiction over him had ended. 
Mr. Leyva does not ignore the court's conclusion that his 
6
 As stated above, the remedy or right of appeal in the 
case at bar was foreclosed by the court's indefinite continuation 
of a sentencing date. (R 125). 
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initial "failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary" 
because of his arrest and incarceration in California. (R 208-
09). This "voluntary" determination, however, is incorrect. See 
State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
In Houtz, the lower "court determined that defendant had 
voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the trial because he 
had left Utah in violation of his bail." 714 P.2d 677. On 
appeal, however, the supreme court disagreed with the trial 
court's conclusion. Despite Houtz's bail violation and his 
arrest for drunk driving in San Diego, California, "[w]hen a 
defendant is in custody, he is not free to make a voluntary 
decision about whether or not he will attend the court 
proceedings. Taken into custody on February 25, 1985, in San 
Diego, defendant cannot be considered to have 'voluntarily' 
refused to appear [in Utah] on February 26 or 27, 1985." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
The situation here is no different. Mr. Leyva "was absent 
from his sentencing in January 1990 because he was incarcerated 
in California." (R 208) (Conclusion of Law No. 1). Despite his 
bail violation and subsequent arrest in San Bernadino, 
California, since Rogelio was in custody there he "cannot be 
considered to have 'voluntarily' refused to appear [in Utah on 
January 16, 1990]." See Houtz, 714 P.2d 677. 
Further, assuming, arguendo, blame lies for an initial delay 
in sentencing, see also supra note 1, a temporary postponement of 
a few months does not nullify a subsequent court order which 
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indefinitely suspended sentencing. (R 125); compare State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982) (temporary delays 
attributable to defendant merely extend or toll [as opposed to 
eliminate] the time-line applicable to a disposition period), 
with supra note 1 (the delays attributable here, including one 
caused by a snowstorm, would at most amount to approximately four 
and one-half months--a period of no consequence to a court order 
indefinitely suspending sentencing). 
As alluded to above, the right to a speedy trial does 
include "a seasonal decision and sentencing following trial." 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986). In addressing 
the four factors [(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for 
the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) 
the prejudice to the defendant], the court here simply contended: 
Although the delay between the verdict and the sentence 
was considerable, it was caused by defendant's failure 
to appear for sentencing or else his counsel's request 
for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and 
committing other criminal offenses in California. 
Defendant did not assert any right to a speedy 
sentencing. Defendant was not prejudiced by any delay 
in his sentencing. 
(R 2 09). However, based upon the discussion herein, the four 
factors reflect the unreasonable nature of the sentence. 
Like the eighteen-month delay between the completion of the 
trial and the decision finally rendered in Banks, see 720 P.2d at 
1383 (the judge died after the facts were presented but before a 
decision was issued), the delay here between Mr. Leyva's July 27, 
1989, conviction and the March 4, 1994, sentence "is sufficient 
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to raise legitimate questions regarding defendant's right to a 
speedy disposition of his case." Id. at 1385-86. 
The second factor, the reason for the delay, is due to the 
State's inaction in pursuing extradition proceedings or in not 
filing a detainer with California and federal authorities. Even 
if immediately custody and sentencing in Utah was not possible, a 
detainer would have asked California authorities to hold him for 
Utah law enforcement or at least it would have allowed Utah to 
receive notice of his imminent release. See Carchman v. Nash, 
473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). 
Had the State filed an appropriate detainer, Mr. Leyva may 
have been returned to Utah following his period of incarceration 
in the San Bernadino prison and his needless imprisonment in 
federal prisons could have been avoided. Instead, the INS 
continued to hold and transfer him to numerous institutions 
without ever filing charges. (R 209; 238-40; 272-78). Other 
than contemplating deportation, the INS did not know what to do 
with him and no entity (i.e. Utah) had expressed or properly 
conveyed any interest in him (i.e. vis-a-vis a detainer). 
The court's conclusion that "Defendant cannot divest this 
Court of jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily absenting 
himself from the jurisdiction of this Court prior to imposition 
of sentence" is appropriate only for the initial time period 
required for sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Upon the 
. . . verdict of guilty . . . the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 
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45 days after the verdict . . . unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders"). 
Following Mr. Leyva's assent to a few continuances and even 
assuming, arguendo, that initial delays were his responsibility, 
see supra note 1, whatever happened prior to January 16, 1990, 
was nothing more than a temporary delay. The court's order 
continuing sentencing without date was an indefinite suspension 
of the proceedings. (R 125); In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903) , 
Rogelio Leyva asserted his right to sentencing, thereby 
satisfying the third factor, when he filed the 180 day 
disposition notice which the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
chose to ignore. The State's failure to file a timely detainer 
is an omission which makes unforgiving and irreparable the 
court's indefinite sentencing order. See Crosland v. State, 857 
P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); see also (R 276-79) (Mr. Leyva 
contacted prior defense counsel to seek relief from his continued 
incarceration by the INS). 
The final factor, prejudice, is met by the holding and 
principles of In re Flint, a case which granted petitioner 
Flint's writ of habeas corpus in order to discharge him from a 
sentence rendered by a court which had no jurisdiction. 71 P. at 
531-32. More personal to Mr. Leyva, however, is the prejudicial 
and needless years of imprisonment he served in federal 
institutions. (R 238-40; 272-78). If a court order continuing 
sentencing without date was not on its face prejudicial, the 
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State's inaction and refusal to timely file an appropriate 
detainer resulted unnecessarily in over four years of 
incarceration. 
Jurisdiction was lost and the "sentencing" proceeding of 
March 4, 1994, was a nullity. (R 242) (three indeterminate terms 
of one-to-fifteen years were imposed concurrently and then 
immediately stayed for 3 6 months probation in light of the period 
of incarceration already served by Rogelio in other 
penitentiaries while he awaited "sentencing" in Utah); see also 
State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) ("because an unlawful 
sentence was void, it created no rights and neither impaired nor 
affected any right"). The court erred in denying Mr. Leyva's 
motion to vacate sentence. (R 206-10).7 
7
 Since the motion to vacate the court's sentence of 
probation, dated March 4, 1994, (R 241-44), should have been 
granted, (R 206-10), a probation violation could not have 
occurred and the order to show cause proceeding was superfluous. 
(R 141-59) . The alleged violation was dealt with independently. 
(R 194, 204). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Leyva respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court's denial of his motion to vacate sentence. 
SUBMITTED this in day of July, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Sec 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.) 
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Definitions — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes 
with mandatory sentences — Resentencing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and mcludes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for ex-
penses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
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77-27-30. Violation by parolee or probationer supervised 
in another state — Hearing in other state — 
Procedure upon receipt of record from other 
state. 
In any case of alleged parole or probation violation by a person being 
supervised in another state pursuant to the interstate compact for the 
supervision of parolees and probationers, any appropriate judicial or admin-
istrative officer or agency in another state is authorized to hold a hearing on 
the alleged violation. Upon receipt of the record of a parole or probation 
violation hearing held in another state pursuant to a statute substantially 
similar to this act, the record shall have the same standing and effect as 
though the proceeding of which it is a record was had before the appropriate 
officer or officers in this state, and any recommendations contained in or 
accompanying the record shall be fully considered by the appropriate officer or 
officers of this state in making disposition of the matter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-30, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-27-31. Short title. 
Sections 77-27-24 through 77-27-30 of this chapter may be cited as the 
"Uniform Act for Out-of-State Supervision." 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-31, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, 9 2. 
CHAPTER 28 
WESTERN INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS 
COMPACT 
Section Section 
77-28-1. Compact enacted into law — Text in enforcing and effecting com-
of compact. pact. 
77-28-2. Department of Corrections — Au- 77-28-4. Board of Pardons and Parole — 
thority to transfer inmates. Authority to hold hearings. 
77-28-3. Duties and powers of courts, de- 77-28-5. Governor — Power to enter into 
partments, agencies and officers contracts. 
77-28-1. Compact enacted into law — Text of compact. 
The Western Interstate Corrections Compact as contained herein is enacted 
into law and entered into on behalf of this state with any and all other states 
legally joining therein in a form substantially as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSE AND POLICY 
The party states, desiring by common action to improve their institutional 
facilities and provide programs of sufficiently high quality for the confinement, 
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treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the 
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a 
basis of cooperation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of 
such offenders and of society. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the 
development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confine-
ment, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders. 
ARTICLE II 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise: 
(a) "State" means a state of the United States or, subject to the 
limitation contained in Article VII, Guam. 
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this compact in which 
conviction was had. 
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this compact to which an 
inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction was 
had. 
(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is under sentence to 
or confined in a prison or other correctional institution. 
(e) "Institution" means any prison, reformatory or other correctional 
facility (including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or 
mentally defective) in which inmates may lawfully be confined. 
ARTICLE III 
CONTRACTS 
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more 
of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending 
state in institutions situated within receiving states. Any such contract shall 
provide for: 
(1) Its duration. 
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for 
inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any 
participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional 
services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part 
of normal maintenance. 
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the dispo-
sition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof; 
and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting 
therefrom. 
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates. 
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the 
obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states. 
(b) Prior to the construction or completion of construction of any institution 
or addition thereto by a party state, any other party state or states may 
contract therewith for the enlargement of the planned capacity of the institu-
tion or addition thereto, or for the inclusion therein of particular equipment or 
structures, and for the reservation of a specific percentum of the capacity of the 
institution to be kept available for use by inmates of the sending state or states 
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so contracting. Any sending state so contracting may, to the extent that monies 
are legally available therefor, pay to the receiving state, a reasonable sum as 
consideration for such enlargement of capacity, or provision of equipment or 
structures, and reservation of capacity. Such payment may be in a lump sum 
or in installments as provided in the contract. 
(c) The terms and provisions of this compact shall be a part of any contract 
entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such 
contract shall be inconsistent therewith. 
ARTICLE IV 
PROCEDURE AND RIGHTS 
(a) Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in 
a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant 
to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an 
institution within the territory of another party state is necessary in order to 
provide adequate quarters and care or desirable in order to provide an 
appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct 
that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other 
party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the 
sending state. 
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have 
access, at all reasonable times, to any institutions in which it has a contractual 
right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and 
visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution. 
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact 
shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at 
any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution 
within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the 
sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for 
release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose 
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state 
shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant 
to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III. 
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state 
on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this compact 
including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official 
designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have the 
benefit of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said 
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and 
in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state. 
(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the 
provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane 
manner and shall be cared for and treated equally with such similar inmates 
of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of 
confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of 
any legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropri-
ate institution of the Bending state. 
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this 
compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the 
742 
WESTERN INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 77-28-1 
appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if 
authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate 
facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of 
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials 
of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and 
a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be 
made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials 
shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the 
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any 
and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the 
officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and 
no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate 
officials of the sending state. Costs of records made pursuant to this subdivi-
sion shall be borne by the sending state. 
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within 
the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and 
receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending 
state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory. 
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have 
any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be 
relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or his status 
changed on account of any action or proceeding in which he could have 
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state 
located within such state. 
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under 
the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with 
respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of 
any powers in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this 
compact. 
ARTICLE V 
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE — EXTRADITION 
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it 
retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not 
reviewable within the receiving state, but if at any time the sending state 
seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is 
pending against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the 
inmate is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, 
the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state 
until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment 
or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state 
shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this compact through any 
and all states party to this compact without interference. 
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined 
pursuant to this compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state and 
from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape to 
a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for 
institution of extradition proceedings shall be that of the sending state, but 
nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities 
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of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension 
and return of an escapee. 
ARTICLE VI 
FEDERAL AID 
Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection 
with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this 
compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state 
pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally aided program 
or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual 
provision provided that if such program or activity is not part of the customary 
correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official of the 
sending state shall be required therefor. 
ARTICLE VII 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon 
the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two contiguous 
states from among the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington 
and Wyoming. For the purposes of this article, Alaska and Hawaii shall be 
deemed contiguous to each other; to any and all of the states of California, 
Oregon and Washington; and to Guam. Thereafter, this compact shall enter 
into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states, or 
any other state contiguous to at least one party state upon similar action by 
such state. Guam may become party to this compact by taking action similar 
to that provided for joinder by any other eligible party state and upon the 
consent of congress to such joinder. For the purpose of this article, Guam shall 
be deemed contiguous to Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon and Washington. 
ARTICLE VIII 
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION 
This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state 
until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the 
sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the 
appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not 
take effect until two years after the notices provided in said statute have been 
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its 
obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. 
Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its 
territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to 
the provisions of this compact. 
ARTICLE DC 
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED 
Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair 
any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a 
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non-party state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nci 
to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative 
institutional arrangements, 
AETICLE X 
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY 
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and shall be 
severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is 
declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the 
United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance 
shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the 
constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full 
force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the 
state affected as to all severable matters. 
History* C. 1953, 77-28-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Agreement on Detainers, § 77-29-5 et seq., to 
Utah officials for temporary custody of prisoner 
Constitutionality
 t o t h i m o n k } d n a p p i n g a n d r a p e charges 
Change in custody of prisoner received, ^ ^
 m C a l i f o r n i a > U t a h o f f i c i a l s d i d n o t 
•jurisdiction.
 h a v e a u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e Western Interstate 
Constitutionality. Corrections Compact or the Interstate Agree-
Compact did not operate unconstitutionally ment on Detainers to transfer custody of pris-
as an ex post facto law that imposed other oner to California without the direction or ap-
conditions on plaintiff than were included in his proval of the Oregon authorities; California 
1958 conviction for robbery, where, pursuant to could obtain such approval by making its re-
the compact, plaintiff was transferred to an- quest directly to Oregon or by having its re-
other state after a 1962 conviction for malicious quest forwarded by Utah officials to Oregon 
assault on a fellow inmate. Ringo v. Turner, 16 authorities. Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733 
Utah 2d 298, 400 P.2d 15 (1965). (Utah 1982). 
The transfer and incarceration of prisoners 
pursuant to compact was constitutional Jurisdiction. 
Crawford v. Smith, 578 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1978), Arizona prisoner who was transferred to a 
Utah prison upon his request to be near his sick 
Change in custody of prisoner received. mother remained subject to Arizona jurisdic-
Where prisoner was convicted and sentenced tion with respect to the question of where he 
by an Oregon court and was transferred to should be housed, and Utah courts had no 
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison jurisdiction to rule on his request to return to 
under the Western Interstate Corrections Com- Arizona if that state chose to retain him in 
pact and, while in confinement in Utah, Cali- Utah facilities. Ellis v. Deland, 786 P,2d 231 
fornia made a request under the Interstate (Utah 1990). 
77-28-1, Department of Corrections — Authority to trans-
fer inmates. 
The E^epartment of Corrections may transfer an inmate (as defined in Article 
11(d) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact) to any institution within 
or without this state if this state has entered into a contract or contracts for the 
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confinement of inmates in said institutions pursuant to Article III of the 
Western Interstate Corrections Compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, 9 25. 
77-28-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments, agen-
cies and officers in enforcing and effecting com-
pact. 
The courts, departments, agencies and officers of this state and its subdivi-
sions shall enforce this compact and shall do all things appropriate to the 
effectuation of its purposes and intent which may be within their respective 
i unsanctions including but not limited to the making and submission of such 
reports as are required by the compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-28-4. Board of Pardons and Parole — Authority to hold 
hearings. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby authorized and directed to hold 
uch hearings as may be requested by any other party state pursuant to Article 
V(f) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact. The board is further 
•uthorized to travel to any state who is a party to the compact to which an 
nmate is sent for confinement, for the purpose of holding any hearing to which 
n inmate is entitled by the laws of Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28-4, enacted by L. Board of Pardons and Parole" for "The state 
980, ch. 15, § 2; 1994, ch. 13, 9 43. Board of Pardons" at the beginning of the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- section and deleted "the State of" before "Utah" 
>ent, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "The at the end of the section. 
7-28-5. Governor — Power to enter into contracts. 
The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of this 
ate as may be appropriate to implement the participation of this state in the 
Astern Interstate Corrections Compact pursuant to Article III thereof. 
History: C. 1983, 77-28-5, enacted by L. 
>80, ch. 15, S 2; 1983, ch. 320, 9 91. 
CHAPTER 28a 
tNTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 
'tion Section 
28a-l. Compact entered into law — Text partments, agencies and officers 
of compact. in enforcing and effecting com-
28a-2. Department of Corrections — Au- pact. 
thority to transfer inmates. 77-28a-4. Board of Pardons and Parole — 
28a-3. Duties and powers of courts, de- Authority t/> hn\A t i » ^ « -uthority to hold hearings. 
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Section 
77-28a-5. Governor — Power to enter into 
contracts. 
77-28a-l. Compact entered into law — Text of compact. 
The interstate compact on corrections as contained herein is enacted into 
law and entered into on behalf of this state with any and all other states legally 
joining therein in a form substantially as follows: 
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSE AND POLICY 
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve 
their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confine-
ment, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that 
it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and 
programs on a basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best 
interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital 
expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide 
for the mutual development and execution of such programs of co-operation for 
the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most 
economical use of human and material resources. 
ARTICLE II 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise: 
(a) "State" means a state of the United States, the United States of 
America, a Territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this Compact in which 
conviction or court commitment was had; 
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this Compact to which an 
inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or 
court commitment was had; 
(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is committed, under 
sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution; 
(e) "Institution" means any penal or correctional facility, including but 
not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective, in which 
inmates as defined in (d) above may lawfully be confined. 
ARTICLE III 
CONTRACTS 
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more 
of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending 
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state in institutions situated within receiving states. Anv su-?h contract *ha 
provide for: 
(1) Its duration; 
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for 
inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any 
participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional 
services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part 
of normal maintenance; 
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any, the dispo-
sition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof, 
and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting 
therefrom; 
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates; 
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the 
obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states. 
(b) The terms and provisions of this Compact shall be a part of any contract 
entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such 
contract shall be inconsistent therewith. 
ARTICLE IV 
PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS 
(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this 
Compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall 
decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within 
the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide 
adequate quarters and care of an appropriate program of rehabilitation or 
treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an 
institution with the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act 
in that regard solely as agent for the sending state. 
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this Compact shall have 
access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in which it has a contractual 
right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and 
visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution. 
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this Compact 
shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at 
any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution 
within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the 
sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for 
release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose 
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided, that the sending state 
shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant 
to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III. 
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state 
on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this Compact 
including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official 
designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have official 
review of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said 
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and 
in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state. 
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(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to thr 
provisions of this Compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane 
manner and shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving 
state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a 
receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights 
which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of 
the sending state. 
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this 
Compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before 
the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state, if 
authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate 
facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of 
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials 
of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and 
a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be 
made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials 
shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the 
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any 
and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the 
officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and 
no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate 
officials of the sending state. 
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this Compact shall be released within 
the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and 
receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending 
state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory. 
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact shall have 
any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be 
relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or his status 
changed on account of any action or proceeding in which he could have 
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state 
located within such state. 
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under 
the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with 
respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of 
any powers in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this 
Compact. 
ARTICLE V 
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE: EXTRADITION 
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it 
retains jurisdiction pursuant to this Compact shall be conclusive upon and not 
reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks 
to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending 
against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is 
formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the 
inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until 
discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or 
detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state 
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shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this Compact through any 
and all states party to this Compact without interference. 
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined 
pursuant to this Compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state 
and from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape 
to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for 
institution of extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending 
state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the 
activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the 
apprehension and return of an escapee. 
ARTICLE VI 
FEDERAL AID 
Any state party to this Compact may accept federal aid for use in connection 
with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this 
Compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state 
pursuant to this Compact may participate in any such federally aided program 
or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual 
provision; provided, that if such program or activity is not part of the 
customary correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official 
of the sending state shall be required therefor. 
ARTICLE VII 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
This Compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon 
the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two states. 
Thereafter, this Compact shall enter into force and become effective and 
binding as to any other of said states upon similar action by such state. 
ARTICLE VIII 
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION 
This Compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state 
until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the 
sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the Compact to the 
appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not 
take effect until one year after the notices provided in said statute have been 
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its 
obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. 
Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its 
territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to 
the provisions of this Compact. 
ARTICLE DC 
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED 
Nothing contained in this Compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair 
any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a 
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non-party state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor 
to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of co-operative 
institutional arrangements. 
ARTICLE X 
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY 
The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally construed and shall be 
severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Compact is 
declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the 
United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Compact and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance 
shall not be affected thereby. If this Compact shall be held contrary to the 
constitution of any state participating therein, the Compact shall remain in 
full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to 
the state affected as to all severable matters. 
ARTICLE XI 
An inmate must request a transfer in writing before such a transfer can be 
made pursuant to Article IV. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-l, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, S 1. 
77-28a-2. Department of Corrections — Authority to 
transfer inmates. 
The Department of Corrections may transfer an inmate, as denned in 
Subparagraph (d) of Article II of the Interstate Corrections Compact, to any 
institution within or without this state if this state has entered into any 
contracts for the confinement of inmates in said institutions pursuant to 
Article III of that Compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-2, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1985, ch. 212, 8 26. 
77-28a-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments, 
agencies and officers in enforcing and effecting 
compact. 
The courts, departments, agencies and officers of this state and its political 
subdivisions shall enforce this Compact and shall do all things necessary and 
appropriate to the effectuation of the purposes and intent of this Compact 
which may be within their respective jurisdictions including, but not limited 
to, the making and submission of any reports required by that Compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-3, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, 8 1. 
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77-28a-4. Board of Pardons and Parole — Authority to 
hold hearings. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby authorized and directed to hold 
such hearings as may be requested by any other party state pursuant to Article 
I V(a) of the Interstate Corrections Compact. The board is further authorized to 
travel to any state which is a party to that Compact and to which an inmate is 
sent for confinement, for the purpose of holding any hearing to which that 
inmate is entitled by the laws of Utah. 
1 M J " 5 ? I L C ' s 1 ? 5 ?^ !* 2 ! 8 "? ; e f a ^ t e d b y L* ° f P a r d 0 n S a n d P a r o l e * f o r * B o a r d o f Pardons" 
l L n A ™ „ , VJ ' C h * ^ \ i t , n e a r t h e b ann ing of the Bection and made two 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- stylistic changes 
ment, effective May 2,1994, substituted "Board 
77-28a-5. Governor — Power to enter into contracts. 
The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of thi« 
state as may be appropriate to implement its participation in the Interstate 
corrections Compact pursuant to Article III thereof. 
History: C. 1963, 77-28a-5, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1983, eh. 320, § 92. 
CHAPTER 28b 
INTERJURISDICTIONAL TRANSFER OF 
PRISONERS 
S e c t i t m
 Section 
Z'lltl" R? f inj t i0,nS-
 t . 77-28b-7. Role of director. 
TTMbi » a r t y ' r • * 7728b-8 Merra] to the United States De 
77-28b-3. ^ b ^ c ^ a for . n t e rn .
 t t rf , Q f f i c e o f 
77-28b-4. Role of the classification officer.
 7 7 2 8 b 9 J^T^ ^ ' 
77-28b-5. Role of institution warden. 77-28b-9. Transfer of offender. 
77-28b-6. Role of Inmate Placement Pro-
gram Bureau. 
77-28b-i, Definitions, 
(1) "Assurance" means a special condition concerning the confinement or 
release of an offender which must be met prior to the release of the offender 
(2) "Offender* means a juvenile certified to be tried as an adult or an adult 
convicted of any criminal offense under Utah law. 
(3) "Receiving country* means the jurisdiction to which the offender is to be 
transferred. 
(4) "Sending state" means the jurisdiction from which the offender is to be 
ransferred. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-l, enacted by L. 
1900, ch, 324, § 1. 
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77-28b-2. Director's authority. 
The director of the Department of Corrections may transfer offenders having 
foreign citizenship status to countries of citizenship under this chapter if a 
treaty exists between the United States and the foreign country. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-2, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, § 2. 
f 7-28b-3. Eligibility criteria for international transfer. 
An offender must meet the following criteria before he may be considered for 
an international transfer: 
(1) the offender is a citizen of the receiving country; 
(2) the offender consents to transfer to his country of citizenship; 
(3) the offense committed by the offender constitutes a criminal offense 
under the laws of the receiving state; 
(4) the offender does not have fewer than 12 months remaining on his 
sentence at the time of the application for transfer; 
(5) the offender is not under a sentence of death; 
(6) the offender does not have collateral attacks or appeals on either the 
sentence or conviction pending; 
(7) all other provisions of the imposed sentence such as fines, restitu-
tion, and penalties are paid in full; 
(8) there are no detainers, wanted notices based on criminal convic-
tions, indictments, informations, complaints, or parole or probation viola-
tion allegations pending against the offender; and 
(9) the offender meets all of the eligibility requirements of the treaty 
with his country. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-3, enacted toy L. 
1990, ch. 324, § 3. 
f 7-28b-4. Role of the classification officer. 
(1) The classification officer of each correctional institution shall be provided 
with the eligibility requirements of each prisoner transfer treaty. 
(2) The classification officer shall forward Form I, Transfer Inquiry, to all 
offenders identified as having national or citizenship status in a party nation. 
(3) Upon receipt of Form I, Transfer Inquiry, the offender may indicate he is: 
(a) interested in pursuing a transfer by signing Form I and returning it 
to the classification officer along with proof of citizenship; or 
(b) not interested in pursuing a transfer by returning Form I to the 
classification officer without proof of citizenship. 
(4) If the offender indicates on Form I, Transfer Inquiry, that he is 
interested in pursuing a transfer, the institution classification officer shall 
complete Form II, Inmate Information Provided to Treaty Nation, and Form 
III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner Transfer. 
(5) The following forms, provided by the federal government, shall be 
completed and forwarded in triplicate by the classification officer to the 
superintendent of the institution: 
(a) Form I, Transfer Inquiry; 
(b) Form II, Inmate Information Provided to Treaty Nation; 
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(c) Form III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner Transfer; 
(d) proof of citizenship; 
(e) statement of offender's eligibility; 
(f) presentence report; 
(g) classification assessment; 
(h) current psychological and medical reports; 
(i) signed release of confidential information forms; 
(j) criminal history sheet; and 
(k) judgments of conviction or certification to be tried as an adult. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-4, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, 9 4. 
77-28b-5. Role of institution warden. 
The warden shall sign Form III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner 
Transfer, and forward the application and the material required in Section 
77-28b-4 in triplicate to the Department of Corrections Inmate Placement 
Program Bureau. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-5, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, § S. 
77-28b-6. Role of Inmate Placement Program Bureau. 
(1) The Department of Corrections Inmate Placement Program Bureau 
shall: 
(a) investigate the request to ensure that all eligibility requirements 
are met; 
(b) request a records check to verify records listed in Section 77-28b-3; 
(c) review application and materials for completeness and compliance 
with treaty terms; 
(d) develop and recommend assurances, where indicated; and 
(e) provide written notification of the transfer request to the following 
entities and receive objections or other comments for 15 business days 
after sending the notification: 
(i) attorney general; 
(ii) prosecuting law enforcement agency; 
(iii) prosecutor; and 
(iv) sentencing court. 
(2) If the Inmate Placement Program Bureau investigation determines that 
the application and materials are incomplete or do not comply with the terms 
of the treaty, the application shall be rejected and returned to the institution 
in which the inmate is incarcerated. 
(3) If the investigation of the bureau determines the application and 
materials are complete and in compliance with the terms of the treaty, the 
application and materials shall be forwarded to the director of the Department 
of Corrections. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-6, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, § 6. 
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77-28b-7. Role of director. 
(1) The director of the Department of Corrections shall review the applica-
tion and materials. Upon his approval the application and materials shall be 
forwarded to the governor for authorization to transfer. 
(2) Applications that are not approved by the director shall be returned to 
the sending institution and the inmate shall be notified. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-7, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, 8 7. 
77-28b-8. Referral to the United States Department of 
Justice, Office of International Affairs. 
(1) Upon receipt of the governor's authorization for international transfer, 
the application and materials shall be forwarded to the United States 
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, by the Inmate Place-
ment Program Bureau. 
(2) The bureau shall notify the inmate and the warden of the sending 
institution of the decision of the application for international transfer. 
(3) All arrangements regarding the treaty process and proposed assurances 
shall be negotiated between the bureau and the United States Department of 
Justice, Office of International Affairs. 
History: C. 1963, 77-28b-8, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, § 8. 
77-28b-9. Transfer of offender. 
(1) If the inmate is accepted for international transfer by the United States 
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, the offender shall be 
transported by the Department of Corrections to the federal district court for 
a verification hearing to ensure the offender consents to the international 
transfer. 
(2) The Department of Corrections shall then relinquish jurisdiction over 
the offender to the United States Department of Justice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-9, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 324, fi 9. 
CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST 
PRISONERS 
Section Section 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition 77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform 
of pending charge — Duties of prisoner of untried indictments 
custodial officer — Continuance or informations, 
may be granted — Dismissal of 77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompe-
charge for failure to bring to tent persons, 
trial. 77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
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Perti, Section 
77 ;:•' Interstate agreement on detainers 77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of 
— Enactment into law — Text of prisoner while in temporary 
agreement. custody. 
77-2f. Interstate agreement — "Appro- 77 29 10, Interstate agreement — Duty of 
priate court" defined. warden 
77-2f Interstate agreement - Duty of 77.29.11. Interstate' agreement - Attorney 
77-29-8. lnter™ate\grt?IZl - Applica- information agent, 
tion of habitual criminal law. 
77-29-1, Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History; C, 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. Cross-References, — Right to speedy trial 
1980, ch. IB, § 2, Utah Const, Art. I, § 12; } 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Dismissal with prejudice. 
Burden of compliance. Forfeiture. 
Commencement of period. G°°& cause for continuance. 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. Good cause for failure. 
Delay caused by prisoner. Premature request. 
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Prosecutor's delay. 
Showing of prejudice. 
Standard of review. 
Warden's delay. 
Written demand. 
Burden of compliance. 
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places 
the burden of complying with the statute on the 
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1991). 
Commencement of period. 
Ninety-day period for prosecution under for-
mer § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defen-
dant notified county attorney of his request for 
final disposition of case or cases pending 
against him; and the filing of a complaint, 
information or indictment did not affect the 
commencement of the period. State v. Moore, 
521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant 
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden 
received notice of his request for final disposi-
tion of pending charges was properly denied 
since computation of then 90-day time period 
commenced from date that notice was delivered 
to county attorney and appropriate court. State 
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Delay caused by codefendant'e action. 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of 
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond 
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that there 
was good cause for the delay, where the delay 
was reasonable and not the result of the pros-
ecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a 
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with 
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty 
at trial as the result of plea negotiations, 
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled 
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah 
1982). 
Delay caused by prisoner. 
Where statute provided that prisoner be 
brought to trial within ninety days of his re 
quest for disposition of pending charges, the 
ninety-day disposition period was to be ex 
tended by the amount of time during which 
defendant himself created delay. State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982). 
When a defendant causes a trial to be de-
layed, he temporarily waives the right to a 
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phatham-
mavong, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Because defendant's own actions in request-
ing continuances, changing counsel, and agree-
ing to postpone trial until after disposition of 
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay 
and because defendant failed to show any 
prejudice caused by the delay, he was not de-
nied his constitutional right to a speedy trial 
State v. Maestas, 815 R2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.). 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Dismissal with prejudice. 
Defendant's convictions were reversed and 
the charges against him dismissed with preju-
dice, where the trial date was set for 218 days 
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of 
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good 
cause could not be supported by a conclusion 
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing 
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve 
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1991). 
Forfeiture. 
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed by remaining 
silent and failing to request an earlier setting 
when trial court set date for trial beyond 
ninety-day period required under former § 77-
65-1; burden of complying with statute rested 
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 
453 P.2d 158 (1969). 
Good cause for continuance. 
Where defendant's trial date was originally 
set for time within ninety-day period provided 
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommo-
date defendant's counsel, was postponed until 
five days beyond the statutory period, the order 
fixing the trial date was within the authority of 
the court since good cause for a continuance 
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 
117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970). 
Trial court was within its discretion in grant-
ing continuance for trial on date 91 days after 
defendant had submitted written request for 
disposition of pending criminal case where sub-
poenas had not been issued soon enough to 
proceed with trial on original date, despite 
defendant's counsel suggesting trial date 
within ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28 
Utah 2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972). 
Good cause for failure. 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he had 
other cases pending against him and in one of 
those cases requested and received psychiatric 
examination and who was appointed various 
counsel because of necessity and at his own 
request, was not denied right to speedy trial. 
State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326 
(1970). 
Premature request. 
Defendant's request for final disposition was 
premature where proceedings had advanced 
only to point of filing of complaint against him, 
since person accused of felony must plead to 
and be tried under information or indictment. 
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State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 
(1970). 
Defendant, who was not finally tried within 
ninety days from date of request made pursu-
ant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to 
exoneration because his request was premature 
since only complaint for felony charge had been 
filed, good cause was shown for granting con-
tinuance, and insanity defense had precluded 
earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 
475 P.2d 60 (1970). 
Parolee who, after being arrested on com-
plaint, filed petition requesting final disposi-
tion of case within ninety days was denied relief 
under former § 77-65-1, where trial was held 
more than ninety days after filing date of peti-
tion but within ninety days of filing of informa-
tion. State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 
274 (1972). 
Former § 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled 
charges and defendant was not entitled to as-
sert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for 
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might 
have committed. State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974). 
Prosecutor's delay. 
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not 
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where 
no tactical advantage is gained over the defen-
dant, since a strict rule that prosecutors must 
file charges as soon as probable cause exists 
could result in the charging of innocent people, 
and could also hamper the investigation of 
crimes. State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (Utah 
1985). 
Showing of prejudice. 
Nothing in this section, its predecessor, or 
any of the case law under either statute re-
quires a showing of prejudice in order for the 
charges against a defendant to be dismissed. 
On the contrary, this section clearly provides 
that if there is not good cause for the delay, the 
court shall order the matter dismissed. State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). 
Standard of review. 
The decision not to dismiss under Subsection 
(4) is based on a finding of "good cause," as is 
the decision to grant a continuance under Sub-
section (3). Therefore, the same standard of 
review should be applied to both subsections. 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). 
Warden's delay. 
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond 
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final 
disposition of pending charges, his failure to 
complete the required certificate, or any at-
tempt to misdirect the request and certificate, 
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy trial 
and provide a basis for judicial relief. State v. 
Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Written demand. 
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appear-
ance to commence the running of the 120-day 
period within which his trial had to be held was 
misplaced since the notice, which merely con-
tained a plea of "not guilty" and a request that 
he be granted a trial upon the charge, was not 
delivered to the warden, and did not specify the 
nature of the charge or the court where the 
charge was pending. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 
1175 (Utah 1985). 
A letter from defendant's federal probation 
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not 
specify the nature of the charges pending 
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and 
did not trigger the statutory right to demand 
trial. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of 
untried indictments or informations. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in 
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations 
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prison-
er's right to make a request for final disposition thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged 
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand 
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and 
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability 
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on 
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article 
IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal 
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin= 
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state 
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition 
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecut-
ing official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the 
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts 
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for 
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. 
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by 
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not 
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, 
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his 
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition 
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the 
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purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to 
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this 
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a 
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the 
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the 
request, 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of 
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article 
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, 
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted 
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after 
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within 
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for 
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion 
of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) 
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish 
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served 
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility 
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the 
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and 
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the 
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the 
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be 
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery 
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or 
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contem-
plated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or 
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter 
an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
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custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final 
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall 
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In 
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state 
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the 
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial 
arrangement may be approved by the custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on 
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which 
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is 
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, infor-
mation or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any 
force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the 
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or 
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of 
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and 
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be 
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly 
used for persons awaiting prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of 
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and 
any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as 
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner 
permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant 
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody 
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, 
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring 
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
762 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-5 
govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary 
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as 
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and 
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and 
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods 
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time 
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to 
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this 
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when 
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the 
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already 
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes 
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE DC 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. 
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the 
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability 
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any 
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If 
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party 
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining 
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
matters. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
—Parole or probation violations. 
Compliance standard. 
Detainer required. 
Jurisdiction retained by sending state. 
Notice to prosecutor and court. 
Prisoner received under corrections compact. 
Sentence interrupted for return to sending 
state. 
Time limit for trial. 
— Between counties. 
— Delay caused by defendant. 
Applicability. 
—Parole or probation violations. 
Detainers based on alleged parole or proba-
tion violations are not based on "untried indict-
ments, informations, or complaints" and thus 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is inap-
plicable. State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992). 
Compliance standard. 
The standard to which administration of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers should be 
held is substantial compliance with the terms 
of the agreement and fundamental fairness in 
the overall result. Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1982). 
The substantial compliance doctrine does not 
dispense with the need for a written notice and 
request by the prisoner under Article IH(b) of 
this section. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 
1988). 
Detainer required. 
Under Article 111(a) of this section, a detainer 
must be lodged against the prisoner before he 
can invoke Article III protection. State v. Mar-
tin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 1988). 
Jurisdiction retained by sending state. 
California prisoner's transfer to Utah did not 
constitute waiver and relinquishment of juris-
diction by California or satisfaction of the Cali-
fornia judgment where the transfer was made 
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers as requested by the prisoner; fact 
that prisoner entered guilty pleas to misde-
meanors and not felonies in Utah, and fact that 
Utah sentence provided that time be served in 
the county jail with such sentence to run con-
currently with the California sentence, had no 
effect on California's continued jurisdiction 
over the prisoner. Buchanan v. Hayward, 663 
P.2d 70 (Utah 1983). 
Notice to prosecutor and court. 
A communication solely to the prosecuting 
officer does not meet the requirements of Ar-
ticle 111(a) of this section calling for written 
notice to both the prosecuting officer and the 
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 
(Utah 1988). 
Delivery of one defective notice and a subse-
quent copy of it to the appropriate out-of-state 
authorities, without delivering notice to the 
Utah court or the Utah prosecutor, did not 
invoke the protections of this agreement nor 
did it provide "de facto notice" or substantial 
compliance. Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993). 
Prisoner received under corrections com-
pact. 
Where prisoner was convicted and sentenced 
by an Oregon court and was transferred to 
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison 
under the Western Interstate Corrections Com-
pact, § 77-28-1 et seq., and, while prisoner was 
in confinement in Utah, California made a 
request under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers to Utah officials for temporary cus-
tody of prisoner to try him on kidnapping and 
rape charges pending in California, Utah offi-
cials did not have authority under the Western 
Interstate Corrections Compact or the Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers to transfer cus-
tody of prisoner to California without the direc-
tion or approval of the Oregon authorities; 
California could obtain such approval by mak-
ing its request directly to Oregon or by having 
its request forwarded by the Utah officials to 
the Oregon authorities. Gibson v. Morris, 646 
E2d 733 (Utah 1982). 
Sentence interrupted for return to send-
ing state. 
There was substantial compliance with the 
terms of this Agreement and no violation of 
fundamental fairness in the fact that prisoner's 
service of sentence in the receiving state was 
interrupted for his return to the sending state 
and is to be resumed, pursuant to detainer from 
the receiving state, after he completes service 
of his sentence in the sending state and an 
intervening federal sentence. Hearn v. State, 
642 P2d 757 (Utah 1982). 
Time limit for trial. 
—Between counties. 
An arrest warrant filed by one county with a 
sister county does not constitute an Article IV 
request for temporary custody of a sending 
state's prisoner so as to trigger the 120-dav 
time limit. State v. Stilling, 770 R2d 137 (Utah 
1989). 
—Delay caused by defendant. 
If the defendant himself causes the trial to be 
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delayed beyond the 120-day period in Article State v. Stillings, 709 P2d 348 (Utah 1985); 
rV(c), the defendant cannot assert the delay as State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551 (Utah 1991). 
a basis for dismissal of the charges against him. 
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77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" de-
fined. 
The phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement on detainers shall, 
with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal 
jurisdiction in the matter involved. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-7. Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies 
and political subdivisions to cooperate. 
All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state and its 
political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement on 
detainers and to cooperate with one another and with other party states in 
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose. 
Higtory: C. 1953, 77-29-7, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-8. Interstate agreement — Application of habitual 
criminal law. 
Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed to require the 
application of the habitual criminal law of this state to any person as a result 
of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of 
the use of said agreement. 
History; C, 1953, 77-29-8, enacted by L, Cross-References. — Habitual criminals 
1980, ch. 15, I 2. §§ 76-8-1001, 76-8-1002. 
77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while 
in temporary custody. 
Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within or without this 
state, while in the temporary custody of an authority of another state acting 
pursuant to the agreement on detainers shall constitute an offense against this 
state. Such escape or attempt to escape shall constitute an ofTense to the same 
extent and degree as an escape from the institution in which the prisoner was 
confined immediately prior to having been released to temporary custody, and 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TI IE COUNT X OF S I • I .T I i I IE STATE : F UT A I I 
THE STATE 3F UT 1 \ I I 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA, 
Defendant. 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW, AND ORDER 
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Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
»in 3 e p t e m b e i: 3 0 ] 9 9 4 , t h I s m a 11 e i c a m e b e £ o r e t h :i s C :> u i !:  
for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to vacate his 
sentence. The State was represented by Paul B. Parker, Deputy 
_ . . __.r._ ._.-:-• .-:«-:.:.dant wa? nrpsent and represented 
L . .. 2abet:. . -: * 
Defendant rresencea 
and Walter Elliot 
Following the 
October 2 9 1 9 9 1 
:,; .,••- L&ga.: Dei --::der * s Association. 
~<~ -fcSLimoiiy ui L itnesses, Loni Deland 
i-^i.Jant also testified. 
-;:der;cr, the matter was continued until 
On t ha t da t e a J ] o f t: he above de s c 3 : :i bed 
pairties returned ai id arg ued the matter fu 1 ] } Each side also 
submitted written memoranda. Having heard the evidence, having 
] :i stened t : the ai g ui iients and ha \ r:i :i lg i : e s i, :i the n len loran 
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Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 27, 1990, defendant was convicted of three 
counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance. Each was a 
second degree felony. 
2. Following the verdict, this Court set a sentencing 
date. That date was continued several times either at the 
request of defendant's trial counsel, Loni Deland, or because 
defendant did not appear at the date set. Eventually, the 
sentencing date was set for January 16, 1990 
3. Sometime after the jury verdict defendant voluntarily 
left Utah and went to California. While there, defendant was 
arrested on other charges and incarcerated. 
4. On January 16, 1990, the defendant did not appear. 
This Court was informed that defendant did not appear because he 
was incarcerated on other charges in California. This Court 
continued sentencing without date pending defendant's return. 
5. The State initially did not file a detainer with 
California correction authorities. 
6. Defendant filed a 180 day disposition notice. No 
action was taken on the 180 day notice because the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office determined the Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
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'"7-29- "1 d'-o n~- .*-:- - • • • cas-s that had already been tried and 
.Irhcujh 1 :. : Del and. was sti ] 1 defendant ? • ::;*• crney 
throuchcr* *" ne r.^r: ^ -y-.* iefendant was incar-^ra^ed "\ z oi 
.-,-.;. : ^  ^_u::d ! e . anc „ .i... .- -.. J not 
file, any n;c::c:.: vilna 1 .! engine the de^ay n . -"-ntenc-ng. 
rtitei defendant served his Lime m California, the 
::to .:ates Tmmicrrai-i np anrl Naturalization Service (INS) 
cntairied custody and held defendant bec.w.s- "f rrcrlems with hi s 
s ' a " - *• . - •-....*...- •
 J::: e» 
transferred ' 'cl::-i ,.dr-. ].;;: .\ _•. ,~^;. . ' .- r-. leased defendant 
Nidi ^ : -r*-?4, defendant w a s present before this 
C:)ur" and wa -  ;*enr e-r -1-.. • ; -:^ r.r ^ n ^ : .;, iefendant di d not 
make an} r obje- :: t: :i on t : t:i :i :i s Cc: i :i :i : !:, about the delay :i i i I: ] :ii s 
sentencing or this Court's jurisdiction to sentence. 
] 0 Defendant has not shown any specific prejudice that 
i e s u ,1 t e d f i: o in: i 1:1 i e d e ] a y :i it: I 1 :i :i s s e n t e i l c e 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. - ». .- . '.-::.. mary 
1990 because A- incarcerated - . rcr::;a. However, 
Defendant voluntarily left Utah pending his sentencing. He 
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voluntarily traveled to California. He committed new criminal 
acts in California. His arrest and incarceration in California 
were a consequence of his voluntary acts. Therefore, Defendant's 
failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary. 
2. This Court is not convinced that a criminal defendant 
has the right to a speedy sentencing. However, if such a right 
exists the four factors articulated for considering a violation 
for the right to speedy trial apply. These factors are, the 
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. 
However, defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing that 
these factors warrant a finding of denial of any right defendant 
may have to a speedy sentencing. Although the delay between the 
verdict and the sentence was considerable, it was caused by 
defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else his counsels 
request for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and 
committing other criminal offenses in California. Defendant did 
not assert any right to a speedy sentencing. Defendant was not 
prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing. 
3. Defendant's request for disposition of untried case 
within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not an assertion 
of defendant's right to speeding sentencing. 
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4. The case of In Re Flint. 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 532 (Utah 
1903) is distinguishable from the facts in this case and is not 
controlling. 
5. Defendant cannot divest this Court of jurisdiction to 
sentence him by voluntarily absenting himself from the 
jurisdiction of this Court prior to imposition of sentence. 
ORDER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant'af motion is denied. 
Elizabeth Hunt 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order was 
delivered to Elizabeth Hunt, Attorney for Defendant Rogelio 
Limonta Leyva, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on the 7y day of October, 1994'rT7 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
PLAINTIFF, 
LIMONTA, ROGELIO LEYVA 
DEFENDANT. 
BEEHIVE BOND 
CASE NUMBER 881908491 FS 
DATE JANUARY 16, 1990 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R HANSON 
COURT REPORTER JODY EDWARDS 
COURT CLERK EVT 
ATP REED, SCOTT 
ATD DELAND, LONI 
BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA 
MOTION OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY COURT'S OWN MOTION 
IT IS ORDERED THAT A BENCH WARRANT ISSUE FOR SAID DEFENDANT 
RETURNALBE FORTHWITH NO BAIL. 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT APPEAR FOR SENTENCING AND THE COURT IS 
ADVISED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INCARCERATED IN SAN BERNADINO, CA, 
THE SENTENCING IS CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE. 
COPIES TO COUNSEL, APPD AND BEEHIVE BOND 
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